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Introduction
In recent decades, international trade agreements like GATT and supranational institutions like the WTO and the EU have successfully reduced the level of tari¤s and production subsidies. Today, if countries want to strategically manipulate the terms of trade of their trade-oriented …rms, they have to choose di¤erent and subtler means than outright subsidies or tari¤s. One potential means to do so is the tax system, especially the set of taxes on multinational …rms.
In this paper, I analyze the tax system's scope and potential for strategic trade purposes. I concentrate on two features of the tax system, the regime of foreign pro…t taxation and transfer price guidelines. The OECD recommends to its members to choose between two regimes of foreign business income taxation, the tax credit system where foreign income is taxed and foreign taxes are credited against the domestic tax liability, and the tax exemption system where foreign income is not taxed by the residence country. As the regime choice is likely to a¤ect the cost of production, it is relevant as a means of indirect strategic trade policy. The same may be true for transfer price guidelines which are required to determine locational income for tax purposes. The choice of transfer price guidelines may serve the goal of e¢ ciency 1 (not distort production choices) and fairness (ensure a fair share of taxable income in all locations), but it may also be used as an instrument for indirect strategic trade policy. If the two jurisdictions under consideration di¤er in tax rates, changing the transfer price a¤ects the …rm's variable cost and, thus, its competitiveness. Of course, by choosing its set of transfer price guidelines, a country will have to account for the multinational trying to manipulate transfer prices for purpose of tax minimization.
2 1 The e¢ ciency related objective implies that transfer prices among related parties should not be di¤erent from market prices in transactions between unrelated parties. This arm's length principle is, however, often hard to apply, e.g. if such market transactions do not exist, and its e¢ ciency properties crucially depend on the assumption of competitive markets. Moreover, even if an arm's length benchmark exists, its use may lead to distorted incentives within the …rm, as Devereux & Keuschnigg (2009) point out. 2 Pro…t shifting by strategic use of transfer prices has been a major research topic in the public …nance literature, see e.g. Huizinga & Laeven (2008) and, for a survey, Devereux (2007) . Direct evidence for strategic transfer pricing is given in Bernard and Weiner (1990) , Clausing (2003) , Overesch (2006) . Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006) document that export prices of U.S. multinationals for intra…rm transactions are signi…cantly lower than prices for the same good sent to an arm's length customer.
1
The implications of the tax regime choice for the domestic …rms'competitiveness has recently been in the focus of a lively debate. 3 Several countries, among them the United States and the United Kingdom, have reviewed their system of foreign income taxation. The UK has already switched from the tax credit system to the exemption system. The main argument in favour of exemption has been -both in the UK and the US -that a tax on foreign income reduces the competitiveness of domestic …rms on foreign markets. For instance, the O¢ ce of Tax Policy at the U.S. Treasury Department (2007) states that "U.S. companies increasingly su¤er a competitive disadvantage. The U.S. business tax system imposes a burden on on U.S. companies and U.S. workers by (...) burdening U.S. …rms as they compete with other …rms in foreign markets." (p. i) As a consequence, the O¢ ce recommends a switch to the exemption system. 4 Similarly, the Coalition Agreement (2009) between the three governing parties in Germany states that the government will stick to the exemption system in order to support the competitiveness of German …rms. 5 Transfer price guidelines have been to a lesser extent considered as a means to a¤ect the competitiveness of domestic …rms. 6 However, as this paper argues, the actual level of transfer prices is crucial for the properties of the tax credit There is an extensive literature on the optimal taxation of foreign pro…ts building on the seminal work by Peggy Musgrave (née Richman, 1963 Richman, , 1969 . For a short overview and discussion, the reader may refer to Mintz & Tulkens (1996) or Becker (2009). 4 Before switching to the exemption system, the British Treasury argued: "Business increasingly operates in a global marketplace, where many of the UK's competitors already operate forms of an exemption regime, (...). The Government therefore believes it is now time to consider again the case for exemption." (HM Treasury and HM Revenue and Customs, 2007, p. 13) And Devereux (2008) adds that "imposing a tax on worldwide income will, in general, raise the required pre-tax rate of return, possibly giving the company a competitive disadvantage in foreign markets, and hence reducing the attractiveness of the residence country as a headquarters location." (p. 710) 5 The Coalition Agreement (2009) says: "We will ensure our companies can remain competitive internationally with our double taxation policies and thus, in principle, adhere to the exemption method on foreign income." (p. 15) 6 Even when, in 2002, the WTO ruled against the U.S. and forced the country to abolish legal provisions that allowed U.S. multinationals to shift foreign income through tax havens, transfer prices got only little scholarly attention from the competition perspective (see Rosenbaum & Olson: U.S. Loses Trade Case to Europeans on O¤shore Tax Havens, New York Times, January 15, 2002).
2 system and exemption system in terms of e¢ ciency and competitiveness. 7 Thus, the arguments put forward in favor of exemption require some assumptions on the level of transfer prices. This paper considers the interaction of transfer price policies and the choice of the regime of foreign pro…t taxation in a strategic setting. It builds on a model in the tradition of Brander & Spencer (1985) where …rms from two countries compete with each other on a third market. 8 As a crucial di¤erence to Brander & Spencer (1985) , I assume that both …rms have production facilities in the third market country which give rise to intra-…rm trade. For tax purposes, transfer prices for input goods received from the headquarter are required. 9 The governments of the residence countries (where the headquarters are) choose a tax on foreign income and -eventually -a transfer price guideline, given the choices of the other country. Then, …rms may choose to deviate from the guideline by setting their own, tax minimizing transfer price.
The main results are the following. Firstly, if transfer prices are close to variable costs at the headquarter, the optimal system of foreign income taxation is the exemption system. This result con…rms the claims of the exemption proponents, but it has to be quali…ed because it depends on the actual level of transfer prices. Secondly, if transfer prices for headquarter services to the a¢ liate are su¢ ciently high (e.g., to shift a fair amount of taxable income to the headquarter location), the optimal system of foreign pro…t taxation is the tax credit system. Thirdly, if both countries autonomously choose the transfer price guidelines (and, thus, use them as a means to strategically subsidize production), the exemption system is optimal for low tax rates in the third market and the tax credit system for tax rates close to the residence country's tax rate. Fourthly, if the third country is allowed to choose its tax rate, it will choose a tax rate low enough to trigger an equilibrium where both residence countries choose the exemption system.
It is important to note that these results crucially depend on the assumption of an e¤ective lack of suitable policy instruments: the availability of direct subsidies or tari¤s is ruled out. As a consequence, each policy choice is subject to a tradeo¤ between di¤erent government goals. The choice of the system of foreign pro…t taxation has to account for the revenue implications and the tax e¤ects on the competitiveness of domestic …rms (and its market shares). Transfer price guidelines are chosen weighing o¤ the loss in taxable income at the headquarter location and their e¤ect on the variable cost of production. If the restriction on the number of available policy instruments is relaxed, e.g. if a direct production subsidy is allowed for, the picture changes substantially. It is straightforward to show that the tax exemption system would not be an optimal policy choice independent of the level of transfer prices. Of course, the question may arise whether a situation in which tax policy choices are the result of a trade-o¤ between revenue and strategic trade goals is necessarily better than a situation in which direct subsidies are allowed for. Moreover, one might ask, if the world's trade organization banned direct subsidies, how should indirect subsidies (such as the tax exemption system) be evaluated. These questions are beyond the scope of the paper, though.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the following section, the model setup is described and the market equilibrium is derived. In section 3, tax policy with given and endogenous transfer prices is analyzed. Section 4 discusses the results and section 5 concludes.
The model
Assume a world with three countries, labelled a, b and c. There are two multinational …rms (MNFs) with their headquarters in countries a and b, respectively. Each of the two MNFs has an a¢ liate in country c and produces a homogeneous good x which is sold to consumers in country c. Demand in c is denoted by X and given by X = A p where p is the price and A is a constant parameter.
Consider …rstly the production decisions of the multinational …rm headquartered in country i. Production of one unit of x i requires one unit labor and one unit 4 of capital. The unit cost of labor is given by w in all locations 10 and capital is rented at the world capital market at a constant rate of r. Production takes place at both locations within the …rm, the headquarter in country i and the a¢ liate in country c. I assume that a fraction of production is located at the headquarter and the complement, 1 , at the a¢ liate in country c. This can be interpreted as the headquarter producing some input good necessary for production in country c, or as the …rm allocating di¤erent "tasks" across locations (like in Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg, 2008). For accounting and tax purposes, the foreign a¢ liate has to "buy" the headquarter part of the production at a transfer price of i . Thus, the before-tax variable cost at the a¢ liate is given by (1 ) (w + r) + i and at the headquarter by (w + r)
i . How are transfer prices determined? I assume that countries a and b -either cooperatively or uncoordinatedly -choose transfer price guidelines, denoted by i . Firms may choose to deviate from the guideline by setting~ i . Deviating from the "o¢ cial"transfer price …xed by the guideline is costly, though, since this deviation has to be concealed from detection. The concealment cost is assumed to equal
where t i is the corporate tax in country i, t e i = t c + t r i (1 t c ) the e¤ective tax rate on foreign pro…ts, t r i is the repatriation tax and t c the corporate tax in country c. Under the tax exemption system, t r i equals zero, and under the tax credit system, t r i is equal to
yielding an e¤ective tax rate on foreign pro…ts of t e i = t i . Note that, in the absence of taxes or under the tax credit system, with t e i = t i , the transfer price does not a¤ect …rm pro…ts. Throughout the paper, I assume that t c < t i .
The …rm in i maximizes its pro…ts by strategically setting x i and~ i . Consider …rstly the pro…t-maximizing choice of the transfer price~ i . The …rst order 10 The equality of wages is not crucial for the model results, but simpli…es notation.
condition is given by
Under the tax credit system, t e i = t i , the …rm does not deviate from the transfer price guideline,~ i = i . However, under the exemption system, t i > t e i = t c , k 0 i has to be negative to satisfy the above condition which implies~ i < i . The …rm sets a lower transfer price than o¢ cially proposed in order to shift income from the high-tax headquarter location to the low-tax a¢ liate location. Now consider the pro…t-maximizing quantity given by
where i = w+ 
are the …rms'total gains from pro…t shifting (i.e., deviating from ). Note that
and f j do not depend on the level of i or j , see also (2) . The equilibrium price is
It follows that the equilibrium quantity can be expressed as x i = p i and pro…ts
It is useful to have a look at how policy choices a¤ect the equilibrium quantities. A small increase in t r i has the following impact on x i :
An increase in t r i has three e¤ects. Firstly, it increases the capital cost since capital costs cannot be deducted from the corporate tax base (…rst term in square brackets). Secondly, it increases the tax deductions for the transfer price that the a¢ liate has to pay to the headquarter. This reduces ceteris paribus the variable cost and increases the equilibrium quantity. Thirdly, an increase in t r i reduces the tax gap between the two locations and, thus, reduces the opportunities for pro…t 6 shifting. The net e¤ect on quantities is positive if the the o¢ cial transfer price is large enough, i.e. if ( i w) >
The e¤ect of a small increase in the transfer price i is given by
If the e¤ective tax rates on income in both locations are equal, as under the credit system, the transfer price guideline (which then is the e¤ective transfer price) is irrelevant for quantity and prices. However, if there is a di¤erence in e¤ective taxation between the headquarter and the a¢ liate in c, an increase in the transfer price leads to an increase in variable cost and, thus, decreases equilibrium quantity. The reason is that an increase in i increases heavily taxed headquarter income and reduces lightly taxed a¢ liate income (without changing the sum of pre-tax income). Similarly, an increase in the transfer price of country j increases the pro…t-maximizing quantity of the …rm in i,
1 t e j 0, if it increases the variable cost of the …rm in j.
Welfare and optimal policy choices
The literature on optimal foreign income taxation usually assumes that the government's objective is to maximize national income. Its focus is on the optimal tax on foreign income given the corporate tax rates at home and abroad. Thus, taxation in this literature is neither about redistribution nor about public good provision 11 but rather about correcting for allocative distortions due to corporate tax rate di¤erences. Here, I adopt these assumptions. Accordingly, national welfare is assumed to be the sum of …rm pro…ts and tax revenue where the former is given in (1) and the latter by
Thus, welfare in country i equals
denotes the social cost due to pro…t shifting. Taxes levied by country i do not occur since they just redistribute funds from the private to the public sector which has no welfare implication, by assumption. The transfer price guideline i only plays a role if there is a non-zero corporate tax in the third market c (recall that g i is independent of the level of i , see equation (2)).
Before I analyze optimal policy choices, it is worthwhile to consider how the benevolent government would like the …rm to set its choices in comparison to how it actually sets it. The answer to this question is straightforward with regard to pro…t shifting. As g i > 0, the government wants the …rm to shift no pro…ts at all. In terms of quantity, the picture is more complex. For purpose of illustration, assume that the government can force the …rm to marginally increase its quantity. The e¤ect on welfare is given by 
By increasing x i , the government acts as a Stackelberg leader and forces the …rm in j to reduce its quantity. This leads to an increase in p as @p @x j = 1. This e¤ect has been analyzed in a three country model by Brander & Spencer (1985) . In their framework, this e¤ect provides the rationale for subsidizing production (via an export subsidy). The second e¤ect is due to taxation. In the presence of taxes, …rm choices have an e¤ect on the government budget which is not accounted for by …rms. Production is therefore ine¢ ciently low. Therefore an increase of production increases welfare. The third e¤ect is due to pro…t shifting opportunities. If pro…t shifting decreases variable cost, the …rm ceteris paribus produces too much which ceteris paribus implies negative welfare e¤ects of production increases. 12 In the presence of a su¢ cient number of instruments, the government could suppress pro…t shifting and subsidize production in order to maximize national welfare. However, as outlined in the introduction, production subsidies may not be available due to international trade agreements. Moreover, the government may simply lack adequate instruments allowing for suppressing pro…t shifting at an acceptable cost. I assume that the only instruments available are the choice of the system of foreign pro…t taxation and eventually the choice of transfer price guidelines.
Depending on the extent of the pro…t shifting opportunities, i.e. the level of f i and g i , production is either too high or too low. In the absence of pro…t shifting, production is ine¢ ciently low. The question is therefore which of the two systems of taxation pushes the …rm closer to the welfare-maximizing behavior. This is to be examined in the following. The analysis has two parts. In the …rst part, I assume that transfer prices are exogenously given, e.g. by some supranational transfer price guideline. In the second part, transfer prices can be set non-cooperatively and coordinatedly by countries i and j.
Tax policy with given transfer prices
To start with, assume that transfer prices a and b are exogenously given, e.g. due to some earlier agreement or some supranational institution. Both governments in a and b simultaneously choose between the two standard systems of foreign taxation: exemption system and tax credit system. The governments' purpose is to maximize national welfare given by (8) . Corporate tax rates t a and t b are assumed to be given, and the government in c is passive. In the following, I will analyze country i's choice depending on given transfer prices and the choices of country j with i; j = a; b and i 6 = j. Its optimization problem is given by max t e i W i with t e i 2 ft i ; t c g (10)
, welfare under the exemption system (ex) can be expressed as
where ex i and x ex i are pro…ts and the pro…t-maximizing quantity, respectively, if country i chooses the exemption system, see (3) with t e i = t c . In contrast, welfare under the tax credit system is equal to
where cr i and x cr i are pro…ts and the pro…t-maximizing quantity, respectively, if country i chooses the tax credit system, see (3) , is su¢ ciently small, this function has two nulls, N 1 and N 2 (derived in the appendix), both larger than zero. However, if g;ex i is high, the tax credit system is always preferred over the tax exemption system. For If i equals the variable cost at the headquarter, w, the variable cost under the tax credit system is always higher than the variable cost under exemption. Only for su¢ ciently large transfer price guidelines, the variable cost di¤erence can become negative. Note that the …rm's gain from pro…t shifting does not depend on the transfer price guideline i .
Diagram 1 summarizes the results. Suppose that country j applies the exemption system and that g;ex i
is su¢ ciently small. Then, if the variable cost under the credit system is lower or only little larger than the variable cost under the exemption system, country i prefers the tax credit system (parameter range left of N 1 ). If the cost di¤erence becomes larger, country i switches to the exemption system (parameter range between N 1 and N 2 ). At cr i ex i = N 2 , it switches back to the tax credit system (parameter range right of N 2 ). If country j applies the tax credit system, the nulls are atÑ 1 andÑ 2 which implies a larger parameter range at which the exemption system is the optimal tax policy choice. One may summarize the above proposition as follows. In the absence of intra…rm trade, = 0, the exemption system is optimal. In the presence of intra-…rm trade and if transfer price guidelines are close to actual costs at the headquarter location, see equation (14), the exemption system is an optimal policy choice and the equilibrium strategy as long as pro…t shifting opportunities are not too large. If transfer price guidelines are used to shift a fair amount of taxable income to the headquarter location (i.e. if transfer prices are su¢ ciently large), it is likely that the tax credit system is an optimal policy choice in both countries.
Tax policy with endogenous transfer prices
So far, I have assumed that transfer price guidelines are given. This may be a plausible assumption since countries agree on international transfer price guidelines which may have quasi-legal status in trade frameworks like the WTO. However, countries may have some discretion in setting the transfer price guidelines whether due to incomplete international arrangements or discretionary ranges allowed for in these arrangements. For this purpose, I assume that countries a and b can set the transfer price guidelines. Country c is supposed to have no means to dispute the guidelines 13 as long as there is a non-negative tax base in country c, i.e. as long as i max i 1 p w (1 ) 
Given t e i and the policy choices of country j, the …rst-order condition for i is 13 This assumption is further discussed in section 4.
12 with
. Thus, the optimal transfer price guideline results from a trade-o¤ between shifting taxable income to the domestic jurisdiction (and, thus, save foreign tax payments, see the …rst term) and distorting the cost of production (second term). This trade-o¤ di¤ers according to the system of foreign pro…t taxation.
Under the tax credit system, the quantity does not depend on the transfer price, (1 t i ) and tax revenue of T i = t i ((p w) x i F i ) where x i and p are given in (3) and (4), respectively.
Under the exemption system, country i's optimal transfer price depends on country j's choice of the tax system. The appendix shows that, if country j chooses the tax credit system, the optimal i equals i t e j =t j
If country j chooses the tax credit system, the optimal transfer price guideline reads
Thus, the choice of i depends on the tax systems choice in both countries and the tax rate in country c, i = i t e i ; t e j ; t c , of which the latter is of crucial importance. It follows directly from the two above equations that t c > t i =4 is a su¢ cient condition for the optimal transfer price guideline to exceed the variable cost at the headquarter: i > w. The larger the …rm's gain and the social loss due to pro…t shifting, the higher the optimal i . To understand the relationship between t c and the optimal transfer price, recall that the transfer price has two main e¤ects. Firstly, the transfer price can be used to manipulate the variable cost which is similar to a production subsidy. This e¤ect becomes the more important the higher the tax gap t i t c , i.e. the lower the foreign tax rate t c . Secondly, the transfer price shifts income from the foreign tax base to the domestic tax base. From the domestic perspective, this is the more important the higher the foreign tax rate t c . In other words, if the tax rate in country c is low, transfer pricing is aggressive and competition oriented; if the tax rate in country c is high, transfer pricing is tax revenue oriented. Now, consider the choice between the exemption and the tax credit system. This choice is di¤erent from the choice analyzed in the preceding section: The …rm either chooses exemption and the transfer price in (17) or (18), or the tax credit system and the maximum transfer price given by
. Under exemption, national welfare is given by (11) . In contrast, under the tax credit system, national welfare is given by W cr i = (p w r) x i F i . Welfare does not depend on the tax rate in country c, since all taxable income is shifted out of country c. The country has no opportunity to use transfer prices to subsidize production, however it can shift all income out of country c without deteriorating the terms of trade of its …rm.
Proposition 2 Assume that transfer prices and tax regimes are simultaneously and uncoordinatedly chosen by both countries a and b. Then, i) if t c approaches zero, both countries choose the exemption system; ii) if the foreign tax rate approaches t i , both countries prefer the tax credit system.
Proof. Assume t c = 0. Then, under the tax credit system, the transfer price has no impact on welfare. Under an exemption system, country i can replicate the welfare level of the tax credit system by setting an adequate transfer price (at N 1 orÑ 1 , respectively, in diagram 1). However, changing the transfer price may increase welfare even higher. Thus, the welfare under the exemption system can be increased by setting lower transfer prices (and, thus, increase cr i ex i ). If t c increases, the …rst term in (17) and (18) decrease whereas the second terms increase. If t c approaches t i , i will at some point reach its maximum level given by max i (due to the term t i t c in the denominator). As shown in the preceding section, a su¢ cient condition for a country to prefer the credit system is cr i ex
su¢ ces to show that
in order to prove that, for high levels of t c , the preferred tax system is the tax credit system. It is straightforward to show that it actually is higher if
which is necessarily true for high levels of t c approaching t i .
Thus, countries choose the credit system if income shifting to the domestic tax base is more important (i.e. if t c is large) and the exemption system if subsidization is more e¤ective (i.e. if t c is low).
Extension: Tax rate choice of country c
So far, I have assumed that country c is passive and does not respond to the policy choices of countries a and b. However, the model results have shown that optimal policy choices with endogenous transfer prices crucially depend on the tax policy choice of c, the tax rate t c . For reasons discussed above, I have assumed that countries a and b consider their corporate tax rates as given, and it is natural to apply the same assumption to country c. In fact, tax competition over corporate tax rates has been extensively analyzed in the literature, in symmetric settings (countries a and b) and asymmetric settings (countries c and a=b). Replicating this kind of analysis is not likely to yield new insights. It is, however, tempting to ask whether country c has an incentive to trigger certain policy responses by country a and b by setting its tax rate before a and b choose their system of foreign pro…t taxation and the transfer price guidelines.
Therefore assume that country c acts as a Stackelberg leader and determines its tax rate t c anticipating the other countries' policy choices on t e a , t e b , a , b . As indicated above, both countries a and b choose their system of foreign pro…t taxation according to a trade-o¤ between production subsidization and income shifting out of country c. Whereas production subsidies bene…t the economy in c because consumer surplus increases, income shifting reduces the country's tax revenue. In other words, subsidizing production by country i harms country j and bene…ts country c, whereas income shifting under the tax credit system does not a¤ect country j but harms country c. Therefore, country c clearly prefers the other two countries to implement the exemption system.
Proposition 3
If country c is allowed to adjust its tax rate t c , the resulting equilibrium implies both countries a and b choosing the exemption system.
Proof. If t c is large, both countries a and b choose the tax credit system and country c has zero tax revenue and consumer prices of p (t e i = t i ). If t c is low, countries a and b choose the exemption system and country c has zero or positive tax revenue and consumer prices of p (t e i = t c ). Since tax revenue cannot become negative and because p (t e i = t c ) < p (t e i = t i ), it follows that country c always chooses a tax rate which ensures a tax exemption equilibrium.
This result stands in contrast to the standard literature where the low-tax country may pro…t from tax credit system employed by the high-tax country. The reason is that the low-tax country may then increase its tax rate without distorting the incentives for the foreign owned capital.
Discussion
As every model, the above presented model is based on a number of simplifying assumptions. In the following, I will discuss three of these simpli…cations and their implications for the model results.
Firstly, I assumed for most of the model analysis that country c remains passive, especially in terms of transfer pricing policies. In the real world, transfer prices are negotiated between the two parties which are directly concerned: the residence country and the host country. Other residence countries (like country j in the model) are a¤ected by the outcome of these negotiations but do not participate. Assuming that the host country is passive is equivalent to assuming that it has no negotiation power. This greatly simpli…es the analysis but, as I will argue here, does not substantially restrict the results in their generality. On the one hand, in many cases the residence country has incentives to allow for pro…t shifting to the low tax host country in order to subsidize production. On the other hand, if the host country has negotiation power this would simply imply that the highest possible transfer price is reduced. This does not a¤ect the results derived in section 3.2, though.
Secondly, I assumed that the …rm's headquarter and a¢ liate act as one player. There are not principle-agent or management control problems involved. As pointed out by Elitzur & Mintz (1996) and Koethenbuerger (2010) , transfer pricing may be used by the headquarter to incentivize managers at the a¢ liate location. For instance, in order to reduce the risk of empire-building behavior, transfer prices may be chosen arti…cially high. In the cases described above, such a transfer pricing policy gets in con ‡ict with the …rm's tax saving purposes. Again, if countries anticipate this transfer pricing behavior, they may choose o¢ cial transfer prices accordingly and end up at the transfer price levels as in the current version of the model. However, additional complexities arise as the a¢ liate part of the …rm is not committed to pro…t-maximization.
Thirdly, the model considers perfect tax credit systems and perfect exemption systems. It has often been argued that real world versions of both tax systems actually are somewhere between the polar cases considered here. Deferral of pro…t repatriations undermine the tax credit system, and legislation for controlled foreign companies (CFC rules) introduce elements of residence taxation into real world exemption systems. Insofar, the model is not intended to re ‡ect all complexities of existing tax systems, but rather focus on a major trade-o¤ between revenue policy and trade policy which so far has mostly been neglected.
Conclusion
This paper started from the observation that explicit subsidies and tari¤s are decreasing in importance due to international trade agreements. However, the tax system o¤ers subtle means to manipulate the terms of trade for multinational …rms, especially if intra-…rm trade occurs. I built a model in the tradition of Brander & Spencer (1985) where two …rms from di¤erent countries compete on a third market. In contrast to the Brander & Spencer (1985) framework, the …rms have production facilities in the third market, but nevertheless import a fraction of their production from the headquarters. This gives rise to intra-…rm trade which requires transfer price guidelines for tax reasons. The governments of the countries hosting the headquarters have two instruments at their disposal, the choice of the system of foreign pro…t taxation and transfer price guidelines. The paper demonstrates how the two instruments interdepend and what are the optimal choices under competition.
Firstly, it turns out that, in the absence of intra-…rm trade both countries choose the exemption system. This is not a novel result, as it has often been mentioned in the literature and recent policy documents. As each residence country would like to subsidize production of its multinational …rm, it certainly will not impose an extra cost on production via the repatriation tax.
Secondly, the picture changes in the presence of intra-…rm trade, if transfer prices are exogenously given (e.g. by some international agreement) and ensure that there is positive taxable income in both locations, the headquarter and the a¢ liate. If intra-…rm trade becomes more important, the residence country may have an incentive to switch to the tax credit system. The reason is that a transfer price that shifts taxable pro…ts to the high-tax country increases the variable cost of the …rm if there is a di¤erence in e¤ective taxation between the two locations. The tax credit system closes this tax gap and, thus, ceteris paribus reduces the variable cost.
Thirdly, if transfer prices are autonomously chosen by the residence countries a trade-o¤ occurs between extracting income from the source country or implicitly subsidizing production. If the welfare objective is assumed to be national income, there is only an incentive to shift income out of the source country if it applies a positive corporate tax rate. It turns out that optimal transfer prices are below the variable headquarter cost of production if the source country's corporate tax rate is low and above if it approaches the corporate tax rate level of the residence country. The paper shows that, as a consequence, the residence countries prefer the exemption system for low corporate tax levels in the third country and the tax credit system otherwise.
Fourthly and …nally, if the source country is allowed to adjust its tax rate, it can be shown that it will choose a corporate tax rate which is su¢ ciently low to ensure that both residence countries choose the exemption system.
What follows for tax policy? The most important message from the above analysis is probably that the competitive e¤ects of the tax credit and the exemption system crucially depend on quantity and price of intra-…rm trade. Moreover, as also pointed out by Becker & Loomer (2009) , transfer pricing may have a substantial e¤ect on competition and should be treated accordingly by supranational competition institutions.
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